


# When the Internet Bleeded

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for  
RootConf 2014



# Topic of Discussion

- Various SSL/TLS related issues in public
  - Heartbleed
  - GNUTLS Bug
  - Apple Bug
  - Lucky13
  - BEAST
  - CRIME
- What it means for Developers / Administrators.



# GIST of Security




**“Most of the Security protocols  
are broken“**

- SSL == inSecure Socket Layer





1000 Feet view of TLS / SSL Bugs

# HeartBleed (Openssl Bug)



# HeartBleed (Openssl Bug)



# GOTO FAIL : GNU TLS / Apple

```
if (result < 0)
{
    gnutls_assert ();
    goto cleanup;
    goto fail;
}

result =

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{
    gnutls_assert ();
    goto cleanup;
    goto fail;
}

result =
```

```
. . .
hashOut.data = hashes + SSL_MD5_DIGEST_LEN;
hashOut.length = SSL_SHA1_DIGEST_LEN;
if ((err = SSLFreeBuffer(&hashCtx)) != 0)
    goto fail;
if ((err = ReadyHash(&SSLHashSHA1, &hashCtx)) != 0)
    goto fail;
if ((err = SSLHashSHA1.update(&hashCtx, &clientRandom)) != 0)
    goto fail;
if ((err = SSLHashSHA1.update(&hashCtx, &serverRandom)) != 0)
    goto fail;
if ((err = SSLHashSHA1.update(&hashCtx, &signedParams)) != 0)
    goto fail;
goto fail; /* MISTAKE! THIS LINE SHOULD NOT BE HERE */
if ((err = SSLHashSHA1.final(&hashCtx, &hashOut)) != 0)
    goto fail;

err = sslRawVerify(...);
. . .
```

- Functions which verifies x509 certificates. Invalid certificates can be passed off as genuine, even though they're invalid.
- GNUTLS Details : <http://blog.existentialize.com/the-story-of-the-gnutls-bug.html>
- Apple : <https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/02/22/applebug.html>
- Test yourself : <https://gotofail.com/>

# BEAST's LUCKY13 CRIME

- BEAST (CBC Ciphers)
  - Allows retrieval of encrypted data by key guess based on block based ciphers.
- CRIME (compressed connection / SPDY)
  - Exploit compression to extract data
- LUCKY13
  - cryptographic timing attack
- RC4
  - (<http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/03/attack-of-week-rc4-is-kind-of-broken-in.html>)

# Status Quo

- SSL 3.0 / TLS 1.0 is broken at nearly all algorithm / protection level either reasonable exploits or conceptual exploitation available.
- Catch 22 : If you protect against BEAST you are vulnerable to LUCKY13 and vice-versa

# Lets Understand Heartbleed

- Massive Effect over INTERNET but limited to OpenSSL
- Effective Marketing and promotion
- Known not just in Information Security Community but to the world
- In short a lucky draw worth 64KB max of data (data != information)

# Twitter Reactions

RETWEETED BY

 **iarce** @4Dgifts · Apr 9

get over it. its not the first and wont be the last mem disclosure bug.Its open src why didnt YOU find it ? #manyeyeballs #fewbrains #pabulum

  17  13 

RETWEETED BY

 **Sergio Hernando** @sergiohernando · Apr 9

+1 "@xor: This last year has shown you're safe as long as you don't use SSL, Apple devices, GnuTLS, NIST standards, e-mail, or cell phones."

  6  

RETWEETED BY

 **NETRESEC** @netresec · Apr 8

Detect successful #heartbleed attacks with tshark:  
tshark -i eth0 -R "ssl.record.content\_type eq 24 and not ssl.heartbeat\_message.type"  
#NSM

  68  55 

RETWEETED BY

 **Troy Hunt** @troyhunt · Apr 9

As others have said, the trick with #heartbleed now may be identifying all the non-web server appliances that implement OpenSSL.

  24  6 

# Reactions

RETWEETED BY



**Sergio Hernando** @sergiohernando · Apr 10

Heartbleed bug. Let's patch. Wait we can't! We don't have patches for our VPNs, gateways, WAFs, ESX servers. Now what? Ehmmm next question?

17 6

RETWEETED BY



**Taylor Hornby** @DefuseSec · Apr 8

Fun fact: It costs \$24.90 USD to revoke a free certificate from @StartSSL  
#heartbleed

115 34

RETWEETED BY



**Sergio Hernando** @sergiohernando · Apr 10

OpenSSL: quite easy to recommend patching, another story is dealing with products that use OpenSSL that we can't patch (vendor dependencies)

RETWEETED BY



**Philip** @\_miw · Apr 9

@troyhunt @bengrubb @anantshri @makash @caseyjohnellis ie: little known fact, Microsoft OCSP takes 24h to mark a revoked cert as revoked.

1

# DIY

- Server : [heartbleed.anantshri.info](http://heartbleed.anantshri.info)
- Test Scripts :
  - <http://heartbleed.anantshri.info/test.txt> (Shell)
  - <http://heartbleed.anantshri.info/hbtest.txt> (Python)
- Login Page :
  - [https://heartbleed.anantshri.info/login\\_post.html](https://heartbleed.anantshri.info/login_post.html)
  - <https://heartbleed.anantshri.info/login.html>
- Video Demo

# Trivia Facts

- First well thought out exploit release where public presentation had prime focus (domain registered 2 days before announcement).
- 3 different sources found same issue within a gap of a week.
- Multiple exploits came out based on initial script which only looked at TLS 1.1 and not of 1.2 and 1.0 hence a lot of the servers were marked safe even when they were not
- Hugely undervalued exploit even by author. Original founder didn't expected the private key disclosure.
- Akamai opensourced its solution for key safety and same was hacked left right center within few hours.

# Trivia Facts

- Not a protocol fault rather implementation flaw and hence GNUTLS, Mozilla NSS or Microsoft SSL is not effected.
- 75 of Cisco Products found effected
- Tor among effected products
- OpenSSL 1.0.1 through 1.0.1f
- LibreSSL (stripped down OpenBSD implementation)
- OpenSSL Bugbounty
- According to CloudFlare, GlobalSign's CRL grew from 22KB before Heartbleed to 4.9MB afterward.
- The number of revoked certificates on the CRL increased from 1,492 to 133,243. And that was just GlobalSign's CRL

# Reverse Heartbleed : Client Attack

- Script
  - <https://github.com/Lekensteyn/pacemaker>

# So What?

- Administrators

- Patch meticulously
- Monitor religiously
- Co-relate, cross-ref, leverage bigdata identify anomaly and act on it.

- Developers

- Not just a admin task
- Start caring about older version of libraries.
- Do not bundle dependencies or maintain updates
- OpenSource MORE EYES != LESS SECURITY BUGS

# Technical solutions

- Enable TLS 1.1 and 1.2
- Enable forward secrecy
- Change SSL certificate (I know there is a revocation cost)
- Going forward you are secure **till no one finds a flaw in newer algorithms**


# Perfect Forward Secrecy

- random public keys per session for the purposes of key agreement with generation using non deterministic algorithm.
- Even if connection is compromised it makes sure compromise affects only one connection.

# Policy based solution


- **Fail hard, Fail early** : Setup exigency process in place : Inform customers if you suspect foul play. Keep them updated. Block login if required.
- **Force password reset** : Don't inform and ask them to change : force it.
- Don't forget **API Keys and other secrets**
- Keep **hardware** support subscriptions relevant or get lifetime **support** : it helps

# Grave scenario



# Questions?

AND OVER THERE WE HAVE THE LABYRINTH GUARDS. ONE ALWAYS LIES, ONE ALWAYS TELLS THE TRUTH, AND ONE STABS PEOPLE WHO ASK TRICKY QUESTIONS.



# Thanks for Listening

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